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South Caucasus’s Kinship Networks as Obstacles to Civil 
Participation  
 
 
Abstract 
 
The research to date on informal networks of the post-communist South 
Caucasus has tended to focus either on the informal institutions’ role in providing 
social safety nets for the population or on the networks’ economic functions. This 
article examines the impact of informal kinship networks on participation in 
organized civil society in the present-day Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. In 
order to explore how kinship institutions affect membership in civil society 
organizations across the South Caucasus, this research builds on a variety of 
primary and secondary sources. The findings of this study reveal that kinship-
based networks serve as a significant source of social capital in the South 
Caucasus: they offer social support to their members and encourage intra-
network bonding, making participation in civil society unattractive. However, the 
prevalence of kinship networks does not significantly affect popular attitudes 
towards organized civil society and the reliance on kinship structures is not seen 
as substitute for membership in formal civil society.  
 
 
Keywords: kinship networks, civil society, informal institutions, South Caucasus, 
‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ social capital, civil participation.  
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Introduction  
 
The collapse of the USSR and independence of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia 
have led to dramatic political, economic and social upheavals in the South Caucasus 
region. Transition to market economy and the end of single-party politics, among other 
things, encouraged the creation and growth of independent formal civil society.1 Yet 
during the last two decades, the post-communist civil society in Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Georgia remains disorganized, often inefficient and, above all, is characterized by deficit 
of popular participation and organizational membership. In contrast, informal 
associational life of the South Caucasus’s societies is abundant with a diversity of social 
networks and other informal institutions and structures. Of these networks, according to 
the literature, kinship institutions are the most widespread and influential forms of 
informal association across the region (Schatz 2004; Aliyev 2013; Babajanian 2008). A 
substantial portion of research on the South Caucasus’s informal institutions has focused 
on their relationship with economic and political actors. However, far too little attention 
has been paid to how the informal sector interacts with formal civil society. Though 
many researchers have shown an increased interest in the South Caucasus’s informal 
structures as coping mechanisms, employed by the population to address economic and 
socio-political challenges (Dershem and Gzirishvili 1998; Hasanov 2009; Valiyev 2011), 
so far, however, there has been little discussion about informal structures’ effects upon 
formal civil society.  
 
This study addresses the following question: How the reliance on informal kinship 
networks affects participation and membership in formal civil society organizations 
(CSOs)2 in the contemporary South Caucasus? This question follows in line with the 
claims made in the literature about the adverse effects of ‘bonding’ social capital and the 
lack of ‘bridging’ capital on participation in organized civil society (Putnam 2000; de 
Souza Briggs 2003; Bandura 1997; Gibson 2001). Following this logic, it is argued in the 
literature that the lack of social capital3 transfer from private into public sphere, 
hampered by the dominance of informal networks, serves as an obstacle for membership 
in CSOs and prevents ‘bridging’ of the tightly knit informal networks (Howard 2003; 
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Rose 2000). This study will investigate interaction between the homogenous South 
Caucasus’ kinship structures, notorious for their high ‘bonding’ and low ‘bridging’ social 
capital, and low registered membership in CSOs. This article, however, does not attempt 
to present kinship networks as either potential obstacles to civil association or as a factor 
contributing towards the weakness of CSO sector in the Caucasus. Instead, the goal of 
this study is to examine the nature of a complex relationship between the South 
Caucasus’s kinship structures and the burgeoning, but riddled by numerous problems, 
civil society.  
 
While accepting that civil sector in the South Caucasus is not limited to formal 
CSOs only, but that it also consists of multitude of other forms of formal and informal 
civil association, the scope of this research is limited to the analysis of kinship networks’ 
influence on popular participation and membership in CSOs.4 Rather than ignoring the 
definitions of ‘informal’ or ‘communal’ civil society – which explain alternative 
meanings and manifestations of societal organisation in non-Western contexts, this study 
aims to understand the development of one particular form of civil association – formal 
civil society organizations. However, this research does not support a Western-centric 
conceptualisation of civil society, in which informal associational life is viewed as an 
antidote to formal civil association rather than a form of civil society. Instead, the main 
goal of this research is to examine the impact of kinship networking on a relatively new 
to the South Caucasus form of civil association – independent CSOs.  
 
This article does not claim that the high levels of reliance on informal networks is a 
phenomenon unique to the South Caucasus or that the low ‘bridging’ social capital is not 
of importance in other regions. What this research does suggest is that, given the role of 
Soviet legacies, due to the ubiquitous nature of kinship networks and their significance 
for the South Caucasus’s societies, such structures play an important part in daily lives 
for a far greater number of individuals in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia than they are 
in many other developing or developed regions of the world. This study admits that both 
the importance of kinship networks and their impact on organized civil society in all three 
countries are also influenced by specific contextual conditions that shape civil society in 
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each country. However, this paper assumes that country-specific differences, as it will be 
seen from statistical data on civic participation and the importance of kinship ties, are not 
very notable; which allows discussing the above presented processes on a region-wide 
basis.  
 
To explore the relationship between the strength of kinship networks and 
participation in civil society, this study combines quantitative close-ended survey data 
with qualitative open-ended interviews. For its analysis of survey data, this article 
employed the Caucasus Barometer (CB) representative nation-wide surveys conducted by 
the South Caucasus-based research institute, Caucasus Research Resource Centres 
(CRRC), in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia from 2007 to 2013. This study also 
borrows insights from two nation-wide CRRC survey projects: the ‘Volunteerism and 
Civic Participation 2011’ in Georgia and the ‘Social Capital, Media and Gender survey 
2012’ in Azerbaijan. The bulk of qualitative interview data has been collected by the 
author during a total of 30 open-ended in-depth interviews with area experts, scholars, 
policy-makers and civil activists in the South Caucasus and throughout Europe conducted 
for this project in 2013.5  
 
 
Theoretical argument  
 
Independent civil society organizations began mushrooming in the South Caucasus 
immediately after the break up of the Soviet Union. For instance, Ishkanian (2008, 30) 
mentions that only 44 CSOs existed in Armenia before 1994. By 1996 their numbers 
expanded to over 1,500 and in 2007 over 4,000 CSOs were registered in Armenia. 
Similarly, numbers of CSOs in Georgia between 1992-1996 reached several thousand 
organizations (Nodia 2005, 14). In Azerbaijan, the number of CSOs was also burgeoning 
since the start of independence: the official estimates by 2007 state the number of CSOs 
at around 2,800 (USAID 2007). Although many of the officially registered in the South 
Caucasus CSOs are the so-called GONGOs (government-organized non-governmental 
organizations) and many more exist on paper only (Civicus 2010), the expansion of the 
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CSO sector also led to the appearance of a diversity of independent civil society 
organizations operating both in service-delivery and advocacy.  
 
Yet, regardless of CSOs’ numbers, registered participation and membership in civil 
society in all three countries remained dramatically low throughout the entire post-
communist period. The data from the World Values Surveys (WVS) for 1996-1997 
reveals that participation in charitable and humanitarian organizations in the South 
Caucasus was incredibly low not only by the Western but also by the post-communist 
standards. In Azerbaijan and Georgia less than one percent of respondents, in Armenia 
one a half percent said that they are active members of civil society organizations. By 
contrast, over 27% in the US, 20% in New Zealand and in Austria, around seven percent 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, two and a half percent in Hungary and over three percent in 
Macedonia reported to the WVS active membership in charitable organizations.6 Similar 
results were also provided by the European Values Survey (EVS) held in the South 
Caucasus in 2008: slightly over one percent of respondents in Armenia, three percent in 
Azerbaijan and less then one percent in Georgia mentioned membership in civil society 
organizations.  
 
Not much has changed in the present-day South Caucasus. The Caucasus Barometer 
(CB) survey conducted in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in 2011 reported similarly 
low levels of participation in civil society organizations: 97% of respondents in Armenia, 
94% Azerbaijan and 96% in Georgia mentioned that during last six months they never 
went to a meeting of a club or a civic organization. Nevertheless, the CB survey also 
presented that in spite of the deficit of civil participation, 30% in Armenia, 36% in 
Azerbaijan and over 33% of respondents in Georgia mentioned that they trust CSOs. 
Furthermore, according to the CRRC (2011) survey in Georgia, 41% of respondents said 
that they would join a civil organization working on important issues for the society. It 
also appears that a decent number of people in the South Caucasus occasionally 
participate in unpaid volunteering. As based on the CB survey data in 2013, 31% in 
Armenia, 23% in Azerbaijan and 19% in Georgia volunteered with no payment during 
the last six months. However, the positive attitude towards formal civil society and casual 
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participation in voluntary work do not transfer into membership in civil society 
organizations and regular participation in voluntary activities. If the overall attitude to 
civil association is positive, which factors can explain deficit of civil participation in the 
South Caucasus?  
 
The existing literature on post-Soviet civil society offers a number of hypotheses 
that explain the situation in the South Caucasus’ countries (Ishkanian 2008; Diuk 2012; 
Nodia 2005). Firstly, poor governance affects people’s ability to get together to influence 
service providers and government officials and claim social rights, demand compliance 
with legal or programme commitments, and express their preferences about service 
performance and quality. The inadequate ability of the state to enforce the rule of law in 
all three countries creates an environment in which service providers and government 
officials in line ministries are not responsive or accountable. The situation in Georgia has 
improved in the recent years but the effects of institutional and political reforms on 
popular participation in civil society are not clear yet. Secondly, the existing laws and 
political regimes in all three countries do not encourage political associational activity. In 
Azerbaijan, civil society is blatantly persecuted, while in Armenia it is generally ignored 
and sometimes harassed. Political and social contestation still remains the prerogative of 
few courageous individuals. Among other socio-political problems, the post-communist 
culture of clientilism is entwined into state-society relations and significantly affects the 
performance of CSOs in the South Caucasus (Panossian 2001; Muskhelishvili and 
Jorjoliani 2009; Ergun 2010). Patron-client relations between CSOs and political actors 
result in politicization of civil society and reduce its independence from the state.7 
Thirdly, formal associations can hardly help citizens to solve economic problems and 
improve their well-being. In particular, it is through their reliance on cash remittances 
transferred by labour migrant family members that people can buy food and pay user 
charges for health care and essential utilities. This present study, however, has no 
intention of challenging these well established in the literature socio-political, socio-
economic and socio-cultural explanations of low civil participation in the South 
Caucasus. Rather, this article contributes to the growing literature on the weakness of 
post-communist civil society by providing an additional explanation of the phenomenon.  
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In contrast to the above detailed factors, the lack of ‘bridging’ social capital is a far 
less often mentioned in the literature factor of post-communist civil society’s weakness. 
As presented by Putnam (2000), ‘bonding’ of social capital is a process of inter-personal 
networking occurring within homogenous groups of individuals. ‘Bridging,’ links those 
groups to each other creating diverse and vibrant society. If ‘bonding’ of social capital 
does not result in its ‘bridging,’ civil processes within a society will be limited and the 
transfer of social capital from the private to public sphere remains minimal. Granovetter 
(1973) argued that individuals within a society are linked to each other by strong ties 
developed as a result of ‘bonding.’ The strong-tie networks are groups of people linked to 
each other by family, kinship or friendship connections.  
 
Gibson (2001, 53) wrote that strong-tie networks “tend to be internally homogenous 
and cohesive, thereby inhibiting interactions with those outside the network and resulting 
in the atomization of small groups, if not individuals.” He further suggests that “family or 
clan is an exemplar of a network characterized by strong ties.” In order to stimulate the 
transfer of social capital resulting in societal interaction, it is essential for strong-tie 
networks to be connected by weak ties (Granovetter 1973). Weak ties serve as ‘bridges’ 
connecting strong-tie networks and ‘bridging’ social capital – a process responsible for 
construction of civil society. Without the connecting strength of weak ties, social capital 
accumulated as a result of ‘bonding’ in strong-tie networks remains within the confines 
of private sphere, locked in strong-tie networks rather than being ‘diffused’ to the public 
sphere. As stated by Gibson (2001, 52) “a vibrant civil society profits from well-
developed social networks”. However, “the social networks must be composed of “weak 
ties”; that is, they must span relatively heterogeneous segments of society, rather than 
being clan or kinship based (ibid).” This means that in order for kinship networks to 
positively contribute to formal civil society, ‘bridging’ social capital is fundamental.     
 
The post-communist society in the former Soviet Union is notorious for its high 
‘bonding’ and low ‘bridging’ of social capital. As emphasized by Howard (2003, 107) 
“[t]his hypothesis predicts that those people who have maintained their vibrant friendship 
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circles with, will feel less need or desire to participate in voluntary organizations.” 
Howard explained the low organizational membership in post-communist civil societies 
of East Germany and Russia by the distrust of communist organizations, post-communist 
disappointment and the persistence of friendship networks. The lack of ‘bridging’ – the 
absence of social linkages connecting homogenous clusters of social capital, was also 
identified as a cause of weakness of the South Caucasus civil society – vibrant and 
complex networks of social capital do not become ‘formalized’ or organized into CSOs 
(Hough 2011, 2). For instance, a representative civic engagement survey, conducted in 
Georgia in 2011 (ibid), has found “a deep discrepancy between the Georgian public’s low 
levels of bridging social capital as evidenced by formal engagement with the civil society 
sector and high levels of bonding social capital as shown by informal engagement with 
family, friends, neighbours and other citizens” (ibid, 2). A similar observation has been 
made by Ishkanian (2008) and Babajanian (2008) in Armenia, as well as by Hasanov 
(2009) and Valiyev (2011) in Azerbaijan. However, in spite of identifying the problem, 
the existing research fails to provide a definitive answer as to how the reliance on kinship 
and other forms of informal structures affects participation in civil society.  
 
The existing literature that examines the kinship and other informal networks in the 
South Caucasus presented that in absence of effective and transparent state institutions 
(Babajanian 2008; Hasanov 2009; Aliyev 2013), the networks serve as private safety nets 
for the population and that, for instance in Georgia “without these informal social 
networks the number of vulnerable households … would be much greater” (Dershem and 
Gzirishvili 1998, 1835). Careful context-bound analysis can reveal that it is the existing 
institutional environment in the countries of the Caucasus that has produced and 
reinforced informal networks: limited accountability and poor governance that have 
pervaded state institutions for many decades have compelled citizens to rely on kinship 
networks in their daily lives. The reliance on such networks helps people solve 
administrative problems and take advantage of societal opportunities, which are 
otherwise accessible only to the elites. A number of scholars have demonstrated the 
importance of the institutional systems in shaping societies in the former Soviet countries 
(Ledeneva 2006; Rose 1995; Gel' man 2004). In addition, systemic problems – such as 
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malfunctioning labour markets that leave citizens without the possibility to earn sufficient 
income and compel them to rely on kinship. A substantial portion of the research on 
informality in the South Caucasus, presented that kinship networks serve as important 
safety nets, which provide their members with a diversity of public goods and services. 
For instance, Dershem and Gzirishvili (1998, 1828) in their study on Georgian informal 
networks confirmed that “[i]nformal social networks are a potential resource that can 
provide individuals and households with the exchange of food, financial assistance and as 
a pool of labour.” 
 
How the reliance on kinship networks can affect participation and membership in 
organized civil society? The absolute importance of ‘bridging’ social capital for 
democracy and civil society was reiterated by numerous studies (Cohen 1992; 
Tocqueville 1969). Putnam (1993, 175) emphasized that “[d]ense but segregated 
horizontal networks sustain cooperation within each group, but networks of civil 
engagement that cut across social cleavages nourish wider cooperation.” The literature to 
date on informal networks’ influence upon formal civil society has been somewhat 
ambiguous. Studies by Wells-Dang (2012) on kinship networks in China and Vietnam, 
Baylouny (2006) on informal networks in Jordan and by Singerman (2006) on kinship 
groups in Egypt point out that involvement of kinship structures in grassroots activism 
and other forms of civic association bolsters formal civil society and increases the 
transfer of social capital from private into public spheres.  
 
While the role of post-communist informal networks is often perceived as positive 
for transitional societies due to the networks’ performing as coping mechanisms and 
because of the networks’ ability to supply their members with public goods which neither 
state nor NGOs are capable of providing (Rose 1994b; Ledeneva 2001; Round 2010; Sik 
1994), informal networks are also known in their role of preventing the ‘bridging,’ or 
transfer of social capital from private into public spheres. Gibson (2001, 53) argues that 
the existence of strong-tie networks is not “conductive to the development of a civil 
society,” and Ledeneva (2001, 73) mentions that the post-Soviet informal networks 
“could hardly be considered as embryos of ‘civil society’”. A similar assumption was 
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also suggested by Rose (2000, 147) who points out that “[w]hile some capital networks 
are used to produce goods and services in every society, their form is distinctive in an 
‘anti-modern’ society-that is, a society characterized by organizational failure and the 
corruption of formal organizations.” Having demonstrated that the existence of 
homogenous kinship networks can both positively and negatively affect civil 
participation, the next task is to investigate the role of kinship structures in the 
contemporary South Caucasus societies.  
 
 
Kinship networks: from Soviet to post-communist  
 
Among many forms of informal networking in the South Caucasus, networks 
centred on kinship links and involving members of immediate and extended family are 
not only the most widespread form of informal networking but are also the most well-
entrenched into the social culture of the South Caucasus’ nations. The strength of kinship 
networks and their pervasiveness in both Soviet and the post-communist South Caucasus 
were frequently emphasized by scholars (Altman 1983; Dershem and Gzirishvili 1998; 
Schatz 2004; Valiyev 2011). As a primordial form of social organization, the Caucasus’s 
kinship networks were known to historians and ethnographers as the dominant social 
structure existent in the region well before the inclusion of the Transcaucasus into the 
Russian Empire (Gadlo 1998; Kosven 1960; Petrushevskii 1948). Yet it is the start of 
Soviet collectivization, standardization and urbanization that has not only undermined the 
traditional social structures in the Caucasus replacing them with a standard ‘Soviet way 
of life’ but also induced the proliferation of kin-based networks as means of 
countervailing the Soviet totalitarianism and preserving the traditional forms of social 
organization.  
 
The massive Soviet social and cultural standardization largely de-traditionalized the 
indigenous ethnic groups of the South Caucasus replacing the pre-Soviet image of the 
Transcaucasus’s residents as mountaineers (gortsy) with a concept of Homo Sovieticus, or 
a Soviet person (sovetskii chelovek). However, despite successfully eradicating or 
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rendering obsolete the local forms of social association, the Soviet authorities were never 
successful in rooting out the traditional kinship and family structures. As a result, the 
indigenous kinship-centred civic traditions blended with the Soviet socio-cultural 
standards creating a form of social organization which was neither truly Soviet nor 
indigenous. In contrast to mainly ethnicity-based local communities of the pre-Soviet 
Caucasus, the communist era informal networks were above all kinship-centred and often 
sub-ethnic (Schatz 2004, 61). Apart from performing their traditional role, the kinship 
structures also harboured an intricate system of informal networking which penetrated 
formal institutions and tied the former to kinship and family.  
 
In the Soviet Caucasus, traditional family and kinship structures were seen by the 
Soviet authorities as archaic, feudal and anti-Soviet (Ishkanian 2003; Platz 1995; 
Sumbadze 2003). Ishkanian (2003, 19) wrote that “[t]he Communist regime identified the 
traditional Armenian family as a ‘backward’ institution and sought to transform it by 
dismantling family loyalties.” In consequence, the preservation of traditional family 
values and structures, albeit unavoidably blended with the Soviet way of life, as a means 
of defying the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was a key characteristic of 
the Caucasus’s ethnic groups under the Soviet rule. Ishkanian (ibid, 20) noted that in 
Armenia “[f]amily not only became a mode of resistance to the state, but it also remained 
the primary means of identification, support, and advancement during the Soviet period.” 
Furthermore, describing the importance of kinship networks in Soviet Georgia, Altman 
(1983, 4-9) wrote that “[o]ne’s family are one’s roots and the entrance ticket into 
society.” Indeed, in absence of transparent and efficient state institutions, family and 
kinship circles served as essential coping mechanisms and often remained as the only 
sources of mutual support and free expression.  
 
Thereby, two key explanations can be offered as to why kinship groups became the 
dominant form of informal networking in the Caucasus. First of all, reliance on kin-
related clan members and blood relatives was a deep-rooted form of societal 
organization, which traditionally served as centres of civil association and for-profit 
activities. Second, persecution of traditional social structures, in particular extended 
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patriarchal families, by the communist authorities forced kinship structures to evolve into 
clandestine, homogenous and exclusionist networks. Unlike informal structures in 
Central Asia and other non-Russian parts of the USSR, informal networking in the 
Caucasus often required involvement of all family members, thus strengthening kinship 
ties. Mars (1992, 103) explains that in contrast to informal networking in Uzbekistan, in 
Georgian networks “since women form the kinship link between the cores of [these] 
male-focused networks, and are the principal source of their extension, there is a stability 
to marriage and an emphasis on kinship links in Georgia that is absent in Uzbekistan.”  
 
Realizing the potential of kinship networks, as noted by Kilbourne-Matossian 
(1962, 63), the Soviet authorities in Armenia “attempted to appropriate kin- or clan-based 
power by legislating against arranged marriages, family vendettas in the punishment of 
crime, and the transferral of some kinds of private property.” Yet, notwithstanding the 
Soviet government’s efforts to undermine kinship structures in the Caucasus, the Soviet 
policy of korenizatsia or indigenization of local communist cadres designed to elevate 
loyalty to the CPSU among the indigenous ethnicities, in fact contributed to the 
proliferation of kinship and clan networks. To be precise, by allocating high-ranking 
administrative and political positions to local individuals, the Soviets de facto transferred 
power to families and kinship networks represented by those individuals. As Platz (1995, 
30) put it, discussing the case of Soviet Armenia, while “converse manipulations (in 
which state institutions are manipulated for the benefit of the family) proliferate, attention 
to their utility and directionality obfuscates the associative and polysemic ways in which 
notions of kinship, nation, and state may intersect in practice.” Indeed, by the 1980s the 
CPSU has turned a blind eye as the kinship networks flourished in the South Caucasus 
empowering families of Eduard Shevardnadze in Georgia, Heydar Aliyev in Azerbaijan, 
and others, to cement their position and continue their rule even after the break up of the 
Soviet Union. In Azerbaijan, as described by Valiyev (2011, 12), the spread of kinship 
networks “led to a situation in which certain positions in the Soviet administration were 
filled only by the relatives of people who already worked in the system, preventing a 
regeneration of elites.” 
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The fall of state communism in the South Caucasus not only did not weaken the 
well-entrenched and sophisticated system of kinship networks but also seemingly 
strengthened it. The networks appeared to be vital in filling vacuum left by ineffective 
post-communist state structures and often provided citizens with the means to survive. 
Ishkanian (2003, 20) confirms that in Armenia “[i]n the Post-Soviet period family and 
kinship networks, continue to be vitally important not only for career advancement but 
also for sheer physical survival.” The latter statement is also applicable to Azerbaijan 
(Valiyev 2011) and Georgia (Dershem 1998). For instance, Valiyev (2011, 12) argues 
that in post-Soviet Azerbaijan “the system of patronage did not disappear, making 
bonding social capital the most important resource for the people. Connections through 
family networks allow insiders to acquire resources much more easily than outsiders.” 
The enduring entrenchment of authoritarianism, lack of democratic developments and, 
most importantly, social insecurity during the last two decades continue to serve as an 
impetus for sustaining kinship-centred groups. Moreover, with the dismantling of the 
Soviet system of free-for-all education, healthcare, welfare and employment security, 
kinship networks in the Caucasus were left as the main coping mechanism in societies 
governed by ineffective and corrupt autocratic political systems. Doing things through 
kin connections, the South Caucasus’s residents manage not only to avoid unpleasant 
experience of dealing with corrupt institutions but they also are infiltrating formal 
institutions and tying the former to kinship and family. 
 
What are the structure, organization and functions of kinship networks in the 
present-day South Caucasus? According to the 2011 CB survey, the average household 
size in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia is four to six people. A typical urban or rural 
household usually consists of immediate family which constitute the core of a kin 
network. The semi-periphery of such a network includes close kin relatives: cousins, 
nephews and nieces, in-laws and so on. On the periphery of each family’s kinship 
network there are distant relatives. An average South Caucasus’s kinship network may 
consist of anything from 30 to over 200 people connected to each other by blood kinship 
of different proximity. These networks can also be characterized by high level of intra-
network ‘bonding’ maintained via family gatherings, famous in the South Caucasus 
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feasts, and other public events involving participation of all kinship groups’ members. 
Such kinship-based structures can be described by Granovetter’s (1973) term strong-tie 
networks. Indeed, the South Caucasus’ kinship networks possess all the prerequisites of 
homogenous and segregated strong-tie networks. The practical function of kinship 
networks in the South Caucasus is in distribution of services and favours among the 
network members. Such services may extend to different forms of social support, 
including but not limited to employment assistance, healthcare, financial support, social 
security and the provision of a whole range of other public goods. However, these 
services are only available to the network members or, for a reciprocal favour and/or 
financial remuneration (often in a form of bribe), to non-network members. Valiyev 
(2011, 12) describes that “[i]n Azerbaijan reliance on bonding social capital prevents 
people who are not members of the family or group to gain access to lucrative positions, 
jobs or financial resources. Meanwhile, membership cannot be obtained unless you are 
born or marry into the right family.” 
 
Thereby, in spite of the high level of ‘bonding’ within kinship networks, there is 
only a limited ‘bridging’ of social capital outside of such networks. Kin-based networks, 
however, maintain a system of weak extra-network ties which enable them to provide 
their members with public goods beyond the network’s boundaries. Yet, the weak ties 
connecting the networks cannot be described as ‘bridges’ diffusing information and 
encouraging cooperation between the strong-tie networks: their only purpose is in 
ensuring transfer or exchange of public goods. Due to the entrenched exclusivist and 
elitist nature of kin networks in the Caucasus, the extra-network ties are neither willing 
nor capable of breaching and ‘bridging’ these networks. Granovetter (1973, 1370) 
described such a phenomenon as an “extended network.” Despite encompassing a 
number of strong-tie networks connected by a loose system of weak ties, extended 
network is not a part of a community or society as a whole. 
 
The South Caucasus’s kinship networks are essentially hierarchical, since it is the 
core family members who usually reap the highest benefits from their immediate family. 
Next, services and favours can be expected to reach extended family and remote kin 
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members. Most importantly, the distribution of services and favours is not intended to 
leave the family circle. Although close friends can also benefit, their share of network’s 
resources is well below that of kin members. In contrast, regular participation in unpaid 
civil association and membership in civil society organizations requires both time and 
efforts of individuals, which diverts resources from kin networks and distributes services 
to non-network members with no reciprocal rewards. Though the network members can 
be engaged in charitable and voluntary activities on a short term basis, the majority 
would hesitate spending their time and labour doing unpaid work for strangers. However, 
it is not only the time and labour invested into civil work that poses a threat to the 
integrity of kinship networks but, above all, it is the breaching of homogenous and 
secluded nature of a kin network occurring when its members begin transferring social 
capital beyond the network’s boundaries. Having presented that the South Caucasus’s 
kinship networks, apart from their positive functions, may also be detrimental for 
organized civil society, this article will now focus on the question of how, if at all, 
kinship networks affect civil participation in the present-day South Caucasus.  
 
 
Kinship networks and civil participation  
 
Survey results 
On analyzing data borrowed from representative surveys held in the South 
Caucasus during the last several years, this study observed generally positive attitude of 
the South Caucasus’s public towards volunteering and charitable work. In contrast, 
declared membership in civil society remains low throughout the whole post-communist 
period and is often sustained by a lukewarm attitude towards participation in registered 
civil association. The data also portrays a heavy reliance on family and kin networks – 
sometimes seen by the population as a far more attractive alternative to membership in 
civil society.     
 
The CRRC surveys in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia present that despite a 
notable gap between the attitudes and actual participation in volunteerism, the numbers of 
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people involved in voluntary work in the South Caucasus are relatively high (Figure 1).8 
By contrast, the survey data reveals markedly low involvement in regular civil activities 
and membership in CSOs. As it appears only a small percent of respondents in Georgia 
ever took part in events organized by CSOs. For instance, only five percent attended a 
CSO organized meeting and even smaller two percent of people called or went to an 
office of a CSO during the last two years. Among survey participants only six percent 
signed a petition addressing a specific issue and four percent participated in training 
sponsored by a CSO during the last two years.  
 
Figure 1. Volunteering and charity 
Source: CRRC 2011; 2012 
 
Furthermore, regardless of relatively positive attitude towards CSOs, a significant 
percentage of the Georgian public (20%) believe that a person actively involved in civil 
work cannot be trusted. Although a higher number of people (33%) said that such a 
person can be trusted, the plurality of respondents (47%) was not confident enough to 
support either statement. Moreover, a 60% majority of population do not think that, if 
they were looking for a job, it would be beneficial for their CV to have a membership in a 
civil society organization. In asking ‘why would you not join a NGO,’ the vast majority 
of respondents said that they rather prefer taking care of their family’s affairs, 19% 
mentioned that they do not have time for that, 12% believe it is a waste of time and 11% 
felt that they would not be able to change anything. However, the majority (over 60%) of 
those who chose kinship-related issues over participation in civil society also appear to be 
rural residents. The respondents’ choice of dedicating their time and efforts to family 
issues leads us to the next observation.  
 
The WVS surveys conducted in the South Caucasus from 1996 to 1997 revealed the 
strong commitment to family and blood relatives among the region’s population: 86% of 
respondents in Armenia, over 85% in Azerbaijan and about 95% in Georgia felt that 
family plays very important role in their life. The EVS survey conducted in the South 
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Caucasus ten years later reports very similar figures: some 94% in Armenia, 87% in 
Azerbaijan and over 90% in Georgia confirmed that family is important in their life.  
 
However, not only the kinship networks flourished during the first decade after the 
collapse of USSR, but also they continue retaining their significance in the present-day 
South Caucasus. For instance, according to the CRRC (2012) survey in Azerbaijan, 96% 
of respondents identify themselves, first of all, as members of their kinship group and 
only then as members of a local community (50%). When asked ‘how important the 
family ties are,’ 91% of respondents in Azerbaijan emphasized that the family 
connections are very important. When asking ‘how would they pay for damage in car 
accident’ the majority of Georgian population (42%) said that their family will pay for 
the damages or that they would get money from a relative (29%), while only nine percent 
mentioned that they would borrow money from the bank.  
 
Regardless of the development of financial institutions in the South Caucasus, 
kinship networks continue occupying a significant position as sources of financial 
support and micro-crediting to the population. Indeed, the reliance on kin networks is 
understandable in light of low household rung in all three countries (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Household finances 
Source: CRRC 2011 
 
Hence, support from family members and relatives might be crucial in case of 
emergencies and situations requiring extra-budgetary spending. Apart from offering 
material and financial support to their members, kin-based networks also provide social 
security (Figure 3). In Azerbaijan, the vast majority of respondents (98%) expected to get 
support from family and kin if they need help around the house when ill, 85% said that 
they would ask only a family member for advice on personal or family issue and 58% 
would need support of family only when depressed and want someone to talk to. Not 
surprising, the majority of respondents in Azerbaijan (82%) said that they spend their free 
time with their family or relatives.  
 18 
 
Figure 3. Assistance in emergencies 
Source: CRRC 2008 
 
The above analysis reveals that reliance on kinship structures is very important for 
the daily lives of the South Caucasus’s population. In terms of differences in answers to 
survey questions between urban and rural residents in each country, no significant 
disparities in answers to questions about civil participation and reliance on kinship 
institutions has been observed in all three countries. However, while no notable 
differences were recorded in the Armenian and Azerbaijani cases in questions asking 
respondents’ preference of kinship institutions and services provided by such structures 
over formal institutions, including those of civil society, in the Georgian rural settlements 
there were a notably higher number of respondents who preferred kinship institutions 
over civil society than in the urban areas. From the survey data, it also becomes apparent 
that membership in CSOs in all three South Caucasus’s countries is seen as less 
advantageous than involvement in kinship networking and, as a result, participation in the 
work of CSOs is often understood as of limited benefit. These shows that ‘bonding’ 
social capital is more important than ‘bridging’ and, therefore, the transfer of social 
capital into public sphere is very limited. Provided that informal networks continue 
prioritizing strong links over weak ties, participation in formal civic life is very likely to 
be affected by the prevalence of strong-tie networks. However, notably positive attitudes 
towards organized civil society suggest that reliance on kinship institutions is not 
necessarily seen as a replacement to participation in formal civic activities. While this 
survey data underlines the importance of kinship networks and demonstrates that a 
connection exists between the deficit of civil participation and the dominance of kinship 
structures, these findings need to be supported by a qualitative analysis.      
 
Qualitative analysis  
To put the survey data into qualitative context, interviews with experts, policy-
makers and civil society activists were conducted by the author between July and 
September 2013 in Azerbaijan, Georgia and in different locations in Europe. Informants 
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were asked to elaborate on the following questions: Which types of informal networks 
are most widespread in the South Caucasus? How important these networks are? Do 
kinship networks affect civil participation? And, why ‘bonding’ social capital 
overshadows ‘bridging’?  
 
When asked ‘what type of informal networks is the most widespread in your 
country’ the majority of interviewees, in the first place, identified kinship structures 
followed by friendship networks. In both Armenia and Azerbaijan, kinship networks 
were described as the dominant form of social organization. In the Georgian case, 
however, it was noted that, although kinship networks are very important, in urban areas 
they often have to compete with friendship-based networks. This observation accords 
with the above presented results of the survey data analysis which emphasize the higher 
levels of reliance on kinship institutions in Georgia’s rural areas in comparison to urban 
settlements.   
 
As for the role of kinship networks in the present-day South Caucasus, although the 
majority of informants agreed that the informal networks are “important because they are 
the basis of developing formal networks,” it has been emphasized that due to prevalence 
of kinship networks ‘bonding’ social capital is flourishing at the expense of ‘bridging.’ In 
Azerbaijan, as revealed from interviews, kinship networks are essential in search for jobs, 
access to formal institutions, preferential treatment in education and healthcare. 
Armenia’s kinship networking closely resembles Azerbaijan’s networks; kinship 
connections are essential in dealings with formal institutions and they are used 
extensively in many areas of public and private sphere. The importance of Georgian 
kinship networks in gaining access to formal institutions and in solving problems have 
been described by experts as steadily decreasing: often due to effectiveness of 
institutional reforms implemented under Mikheil Saakashvili. For instance, if a decade 
ago “to obtain many goods and services [in Georgia] one had to depend on personal 
networks,” after the reforms “the importance of informal connections decreased.” It was 
emphasized by the majority of Georgian informants that, largely because of institutional 
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improvements, the popular attitude towards the use of kinship connections has changed 
and that “people are less willing to use kinship networks.” 
 
The impact of kinship networks on popular attitudes towards CSOs has been 
identified as both positive and negative. On the one hand, over 60% of interviewees have 
argued that the strength of kinship structures is not always an obstacle for formal civil 
society and “on the contrary, [over time] it will contribute to formal institutions.” Due to 
existence of well-developed ‘bonding’ social capital, people are more likely to get 
together with those outside their kinship groups to pursue common interests and 
objectives. In Armenia, as noted by numerous informants, ‘bonding’ social capital 
sometimes encourages people to participate in civil work at communal or neighbourhood 
levels. Although in Azerbaijan associational life remains limited to the realms of family 
and kinship circles, the network capital slowly begins to engage in formal types of civil 
work, such as irregular volunteering. In the Georgian case, because the kinship 
institutions become more and more limited to “very traditional things, such as birth and 
death issues; that is, weddings and funerals and other immediate family-related issues,” 
“people can still form formal institutions and [at the same time] have these informal 
[kinship] structures.” One particular case of transformation of ‘bonding’ capital in 
Georgia has been illustrated on an example of the so-called ‘condominium associations’ 
in Tbilisi: volunteer groups made up of residents of apartment buildings who are to 
oversee the spending of funds allocated by the Mayor’s office to be used for repair and 
renovation of buildings. As explained by an informant: “people are, if not willing, but at 
least encouraged to form condominium associations because a random person cannot 
apply for funding.”  
 
On the other hand, the South Caucasus populations’ heavy reliance on kinship 
networks was also identified as an obstacle for volunteerism and other forms of civil 
participation. Similar to findings of CRRC surveys, over 80% of informants believed that 
volunteering and membership in NGOs are negatively affected by the dominance of 
kinship structures,  because “people are mostly interested in assisting their families and 
not inclined to do voluntary work for others.” While over half (60%) of interview 
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participants hypothesized that due to homogenous and individualistic nature of kinship 
networks, such structures can be detrimental for formal civil society organizations, 
including CSOs, some 20% of informants were confident that low participation in CSOs 
is due to people’s engagement in kinship circles and because of kinship networks’ high 
capacities of problem-solving.   
 
Many interviewees emphasized that ‘bonding’ social capital is dominant in the 
South Caucasus’s societies mainly because of reliance on informal institutions, of which, 
kinship networks are still the most widespread structure. In case of Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, kinship networks were described both as the most prominent form of social 
organization and as the key source of ‘bonding’ social capital. In the Georgian case, it has 
been argued that “[w]hat Georgians have kept from the Soviet period is the ‘bonding’ 
capital and the attitude that we can share [useful information, etc.] only with family 
members or your neighbours but not with someone from outside. We do not have much 
of ‘bridging’ capital and that is what is hindering this [civil society development] 
process”. The lack of ‘bridging’ social capital was also associated with the culture of 
‘individualism,’ as a result of which there is “no tradition of meaningful collective 
action.” Over half of interviewees thought that the tradition of individualism is sustained 
by people’s preference to rely on their immediate family and kinship circles and that 
“nobody will go beyond households and beyond relatives. That is why collective action 
normally does not exist.” Therefore, the unwillingness of the South Caucasus’s residents 
to engage in collective action is closely associated with the preference of maintaining 
kinship networks as result of which “people think about families … and they do not want 
to go out and solve some social problems.”  
 
In sum, the opinions of expert community on the relationship between the South 
Caucasus’s kinship networks and civil participation support presented in this study 
assumption that strong ‘bonding’ social capital negatively affects civil participation. 
However, most informants avoided directly linking kinship networks with the deficit of 
civil participation in the South Caucasus. The majority of interviewees presented kinship 
structures not as substitute to formal civil society but as its supplement. Although 
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preference for kinship networks is seen as more important than civil participation, people 
across the South Caucasus invest heavily in maintaining kinship ties to address social and 
economic problems that cannot be solved formally due to the weakness of formal 
institutions.  
  
 
Do kinship networks affect civil participation? 
 
This paper argued that high ‘bonding’ social capital, produced as a result of reliance 
on kinship ties, and low ‘bridging’ social capital occurring due to limited social and 
institutional trust, observed across the region, should not be overlooked as one of the 
causes leading to low membership in organized civil society in the South Caucasus. This 
article, however, has not suggested that the reliance on kinship institutions is a 
phenomenon intrinsic only to the South Caucasus’s countries, rather the above discussed 
kinship structures can be observed in many developing regions of the world. What is 
different in the South Caucasus’s case is the degree of their spread within societies, partly 
explained by legacies of the Soviet rule, which conditions the impact of these structures 
on civil participation. Several conclusions emerge from this analysis.  
 
Firstly, the bulk of social capital in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia is embedded 
in kin-based networks – homogenous, segregated and isolated, yet, dense and rich with 
intra-network ‘bonding’ groups. The analysis of primary sources confirms that, in 
contrast to the Russia’s networks of friends mentioned by Howard (2003), the present-
day informal sector of the South Caucasus is dominated by kinship networks. Not only 
the South Caucasus’s population has higher reliance on kinship ties rather than on 
friendship connections but they also emphasize family and kin as the key source of social 
and economic support. The covert elitist nature of kinship networks, characterized by the 
right of passage only through birth or marriage, is needed to protect the network capital 
from the autocratic state and to procure hard-to-find goods and unavailable services in the 
times of economic hardships. Far from disappearing after the collapse of state 
communism in the South Caucasus, kinship networks continued proliferating. Two 
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decades after the independence of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, representative 
surveys conducted in these three republics show strong reliance on kinship structures not 
only for economic assistance but also for social support and civic association. If low 
average household incomes and limited usage of formal financial institutions sustain the 
economic function of networks, the inefficiency, or absence, of social and civil services 
allow kinship networks to maintain control over private sphere in order to provide their 
members with social support, welfare and a range of other services. Hence, kinship 
networks generate social capital and serve as a medium of civic association – vibrant yet 
limited to kin boundaries.  
 
Secondly, since the collapse of the USSR declared membership in formal civil 
society organizations in all three South Caucasus’s republics remains consistently low. 
The unwillingness to join organized civil society is often explained by the preference of 
‘taking care of family issues,’ thereby, emphasizing the centrality of kinship networks in 
the day-to-day lives of the South Caucasus’s residents. Although citizens of the post-
Soviet Caucasus occasionally volunteer and donate to charity, they evidently remain 
rather negative towards registered membership in CSOs. Though part of the explanation 
for why post-Soviet population shuns organizational membership could be in what 
Howard (2003) described as the negative experience of communist institutions, it is 
obvious that the persistent deficit of civil participation among people with no experience 
of life under the communism, that is, of post-communist generations, suggests that the 
causes are most likely to be in the social structure. Furthermore, this study has found no 
evidence that the South Caucasus’s residents distrust CSOs en masse or associate civil 
participation with membership in communist organizations. Rather, membership in 
organized civil society is seen as less advantageous than involvement in kinship networks 
and, therefore, the latter cannot be ignored as one of the causes of low participation in the 
post-Soviet civil sector. 
 
In answering the main question of this study – ‘how the kinship networks affect 
participation in organized civil society in the South Caucasus’ – the findings of the 
current study are consistent with those of Putnam (2000), Howard (2003) and Gibson 
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(2001) who argued that the high levels of ‘bonding’ and levels of ‘bridging’ prevent the 
transfer of social capital from private into public spheres and may potentially hamper the 
development of organized civil society. This finding is also in agreement with 
Babajanian’s (2008), Hasanov’s (2009) and Hough’s (2011) findings which showed that 
the South Caucasus residents’ heavy reliance on kinship structures increases the 
‘bonding’ social capital. Theoretically, the prevalence of kinship networks reduces the 
necessity of taking part in regular civil activities and holding membership in formal civil 
society organizations. However, on practice the kinship groups’ role in affecting civil 
participation is not exclusively negative.  
 
This study has been unable to demonstrate that the population’s reliance on kinship 
networking decisively affects participation in formal civil society. The evidence shows 
that the reliance on kinship institutions steady shifts towards more family-related issues 
and the networks become less influential in public sphere. Although the high levels of 
‘bonding’ social capital present a challenge for civil participation, the generally positive 
attitudes towards volunteerism and civil society suggest that the impact of kinship 
networks on the South Caucasus’s civil society is filtered through other factors. Given 
that the weakness of civil society in the South Caucasus, as demonstrated by numerous 
studies (Ishkanian 2003; Hasanov 2009; Nodia 2005), is due to a variety of interrelated 
socio-political and socio-economic factors, the populations preference for informal 
networks over formal civil institutions occurs not only because of the significance of 
informal structures but is also due to the lack of effectiveness of formal institutions. 
While the de-atomization of kinship networks could bolster population’s interest in 
participating in organized civil society, the transformation of networks is not likely to 
happen until the underlying political, economic and social causes which in the first place 
led to the proliferation and strengthening of the South Caucasus’s kinship institutions, are 
addressed. Further research needs to be done to closely investigate the causes of 
populations’ reliance on kinship structures throughout the post-communist period and the 
kinship networks influence on participation in particular types of formal civil society 
organizations.  
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Endnotes  
                                                 
1       This study distinguishes civil society from political and economic societies and understands 
it as a sector consisting of independent, non-violent organizations, associations and movements 
not in pursuit of material gains or a political office (Habermas 1996; Tocqueville 1969). The 
above definition of ‘civil society’ excludes “uncivil” elements of civil society (Kopecky 2003), 
such as extremist groups, as well as radical religious organizations.  
2    The term ‘civil society organizations’ (CSOs) is employed here as a generic term 
encompassing a diversity of legally registered groups and organizations, including, but not 
limited to political, environmental, educational, cultural, professional, charitable, humanitarian 
and rights groups. Rather than specifically focusing on particular types of CSOs, this study 
analyzes participation in CSOs as a sum of registered membership in all forms of civil society 
organizations. Unlike non-governmental organizations (NGOs), CSOs constitute a broader 
segment of civil society. 
3        The concept of ‘social capital’ is much broader than that of civil society, albeit civil society 
is an inseparable and central component of social capital. In contrast to civil society, most 
definitions of social capital include family, market and a variety of interpersonal networks 
constituting an aggregate of modern society. 
4          The term ‘civil participation’ employed in this article refers to organizational membership, 
and other forms of regular formal participation in the work of CSOs.     
5         All interviews were conducted in confidentiality and the names of interviewees are 
withheld by mutual agreement. Apart from fieldwork in Tbilisi, Georgia and Baku, Azerbaijan, a 
number of elite informants were interviewed at universities and international organizations in 
Europe, for instance at the University of Amsterdam and the European Commission in Brussels. 
Interview participants were selected based to their expertise on the topic determined on the basis 
of their publications and/or relevant work experience. Interviews were structured as semi-formal 
discussions, where informants were asked to elaborate on topics of civil participation and kinship 
networks in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.  
6     Although Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2013) have found a significant deficit of civil 
participation in such post-communist countries as Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic, 
participation in NGOs in these Central Eastern European countries is still above the South 
Caucasus’s average. However, Howard (2003: 58) suggests treating Poland as an “exception” 
among other non-Soviet post-communist countries because of its “unusually weak civil society.” 
7          Informal networks play an important role in sustaining patron-client relations in the South 
Caucasus. Yet, although the involvement of kinship networks in patron-client relations affects the 
strength of formal civil society, the linkage between clientilism and civil participation is not easy 
to observe.  
8            For example, the European Values survey (EVS) reported that only 2.4% of people in the 
UK, 2.2% in Germany and 2.5% in France indicated that they currently participate in voluntary 
work.  
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